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The paper measures regional GDP growth losses that a smaller mar-
ket size caused by the reintroduction of legal and administrative
barriers would cause. We model augmented barriers in a Keynesian
framework, pointing at four effects: a border effect, stronger for
regions close to borders; an exposure effect, stronger for regions
open to trade; a centrality effect, affecting areas close to the eco-
nomic core; a demand concentration effect, stronger for regions close
to large trading partners. By estimating border effects with data on
EU NUTS 3 regions and simulating a general increase in barriers
among EU countries, the four regional effects clearly emerge.
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The recent choice of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union has revamped the debate on the potential
costs of Brexit for both the UK and for other EU member states. An empirical verification of the magnitude of such
costs would implicitly confirm the relevance of the EU Common Market, thus minimizing the risk of a domino effect,
with other countries in their turn receding from EU membership.
The sheer existence of economic losses due to leaving the EU is not criticized; such losses have been recently
indirectly measured, by showing that GDP losses affect EU member states because of an imperfect implementation
of the Single Market. Based on the celebrated Cecchini report (Cecchini, Jacquemin, Robinson, & Catinat, 1988),
several studies measured the costs of the incomplete Single Market, which on average are found to be relevant, with
estimates ranging from 2.2% (Ilzkovitz, Dierx, Kovacs, & Sousa, 2007) to 12% of EU GDP (Campos, Corricelli, &
Moretti, 2014), depending on the methodology used and the types of barriers analysed. In Dunne (2015) the losses
of non‐Europe were assessed at 1.6 trillion Euros, with, among their many determinants, 400 billion Euros being
due to the absence of a joint digital market, and 615 billion Euros due to the absence of a single market for consumers
and citizens. Along the same lines, the removal of barriers in the area of e‐commerce alone would engender benefits
equal to 748 billion Euros (Godel, Harms, Jones, & Mantovani, 2016). More recently, the cost of existing legal and- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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2 CAPELLO ET AL.administrative barriers has been estimated as 9% of total GDP in border regions (Camagni, Capello, Caragliu, &
Toppeta, 2017).
This paper contributes to the debate on the costs of EU dismembering by focusing on a specific effect that the EU
disintegration would engender, namely, the missed access to a large and integrated market for intermediate and final
goods. We leave aside all other macroeconomic effects that the EU dismembering would cause, thereby focusing on
pure demand‐side effects through the loss of international trade. The collapse of the Single Market would reintroduce
a high number of legal and administrative barriers among EU countries, hampering international trade and the free
movement of goods, and theoretically causing a slowdown in economic growth.
More in detail, the paper measures the spatial distribution of GDP growth losses due to the missed access to a
large and integrated market. Ex ante, it is difficult to speculate whether the GDP slowdown due to the dismembering
of the Single Market would be higher in rich areas, where most economic activities are located, or in weaker regions,
suffering from the loss of demand spillovers due to a generally more dynamic national economy.
In order to reach this goal, we first introduce a theoretical model, based on a Keynesian framework, and describe
the impact of legal and administrative barriers on trade. Such barriers are expected to hamper demand spillovers that
regions receive as a consequence of being part of the Single Market. An increase in legal and administrative barriers
due to the EU dismembering is expected to engender four spatial effects: a border effect, capturing the proximity of
the region to a border, an exposure effect, measuring the dependence of the regional economy from international
trade, a demand concentration effect, measuring the distance of regions to significant (large) trading partners in which
income is concentrated, and a centrality effect, capturing the pure physical proximity of the regional economy to trade
partners.
To empirically detect whether our theoretical model finds empirical validation, we estimate a regional growth
model for all European NUTS 3 regions, in which, among the traditional explicative and control variables, regional
growth is made dependent on demand spillovers, measured as the GDP of neighbouring regions, weighted by physical
distance and by the degree of openness of the region. The barrier effect is estimated by measuring how much demand
spillovers change their weight in explaining regional growth when a legal and administrative barrier is present. As we
shall see, econometric estimates show that the existing legal and administrative barriers between EU countries do
generate demand spillover losses, which translate into lower GDP growth.
The last step of this empirical exercise is to simulate a situation in which barriers strongly increase among all EU
countries. This simulation illustrates that the loss of GDP due to a reduction in demand spillovers decreases with
different intensity in different regions, with a remarkable spatial heterogeneity; the four effects theorized by the
model clearly show up.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, a brief review of the literature discussing the theo-
retical advantages of Single Market is presented; were the Single Market to collapse, such integration advantages
would turn into costs (i.e. missed growth opportunities). Section 3 presents our logical approach by setting out a the-
oretical model, based on a Keynesian framework, which models the impact of the increase in trade barriers on regional
GDP growth. In Section 4 the model is empirically tested, and the data are discussed, with a particular focus on how
we measure legal and administrative barriers. Section 5 presents the simulation and the empirical results. Section 6
concludes.2 | ADVANTAGES OF MARKET INTEGRATION: REGIONAL EFFECTS
International economics has devoted many efforts to demonstrate the advantages gained in trade through integra-
tion.1 One branch of international economics dedicated to such effort is customs unions theory. This literature
emphasizes how the creation of a customs union entails the abolition of economic and institutional barriers to1On the effects of creation of the European CommonMarket seeThirlwall (1974), Balassa (1975) and Scitovski (1958). On those of the
creation of the Single Market see Cecchini et al. (1988), Quévit (1992) and Camagni (1992).
CAPELLO ET AL. 3international trade through the elimination of customs tariffs and duties, the harmonization of technical standards in
production, the adoption of rules on the (possibly, certified) quality of products, on their safety and transport, the
abolition of disparities in the indirect taxation of consumption goods, and the adoption of common regulations of
capital markets.
Custom unions eventually cause an expansion of the final markets for goods and services with the emergence of
large integrated markets, bearing substantial advantages (Capello, 2016):
• an increase in competition. Each region purchases from the most efficient supplier in the European market;
• greater economies of scale in manufacturing due to larger market size;
• the stimulation of trade in final and intermediate goods because local markets can be replaced by newly accessible
more distant ones;
• increased investment prompted by forecasts of greater competition: an effect which comes about even before
the creation of single market, as a result of market expectations to which firms quickly adjust;
• demand for a greater variety of goods because of increased per capita income (income effect);
• a shift of demand towards goods produced with more efficient techniques guaranteeing lower prices for the same
quality; and
• technology and knowledge transfers from strong to weak regions.
All these channels are expected to have different spatial impacts. With the exception of the last effect, all such
channels tend to favour rich and more advanced regions. The latter in fact own the financial, productive and knowl-
edge resources needed for coping with increased competition, for meeting a more diversified demand schedule, for
exploiting increased scale economies, and for making substantial, focused, and timely investment as the creation of
a Single Market proceeds.
The only source of advantages in the integration process that seems to favour lagging regions is the expected
technology transfer from the “centre” to the “periphery.” However, this is clearly a rather complex process, which
requires substantial local know‐how (not necessarily available in weaker regions) to enhance the exploitation of
new technologies for reaching local growth targets. These expectations have been indirectly verified in the first period
of the Single Market, when regional disparities increased, suggesting that advantages were concentrating in richer
areas (CEC, 2001; Petrakos, Rodríguez‐Pose, & Rovolis, 2005).
Another interesting spatially differentiated effect of the Single Market has been observed when formerly socialist
countries entered the EU. As the result of this new (2004–2007) wave of enlargement, intra‐national disparities
increased because of the centripetal forces of economic development in the metropolitan and core areas of these
Countries. Economic activity in these countries, in fact, concentrated in areas closer to the old members of the EU,
as demonstrated in many studies (Bachtler & Downes, 1999; Petrakos, 2000; Resmini, 2007; Traistaru, Nijkamp, &
Resmini, 2003).
Regional disparities increased as a result of economic integration also at the micro‐territorial level. This is for
instance the case of spatial disparities between strong and weak areas within countries after the creation of the single
European market in 1993; in the Italian case, for instance, positive effects were mostly registered in large cities such as
Milan, Rome and Naples while small and medium cities benefited much less from the institutional framework (Camagni
& Pompili, 1990; Capello, 2002).
The exposure of lagging regions to the windfalls of strong competition within single markets has been thoroughly
analysed in the new economic geography (NEG) literature, which discusses at length the clash between centripetal
and centrifugal forces in shaping the spatial distribution of resources. NEG provides several interesting results that
are useful to properly frame our own theoretical setting. One channel that may potentially be conducive to losses
for lagging regions in case of more integrated markets is discussed in Puga (2002), which shows that increased market
integration could expose lagging regions to fiercer competition. Besides, Breinlich (2006) and Head and Mayer (2006)
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integrated markets are thus expected to be conducive to higher nominal wages (and, by the same token, reduced mar-
ket integration such as that following the EU dismembering, is expected to cause a generalized increase in nominal
salaries).
The natural question stemming from this literature is whether we could expect specular (i.e., negative) effects as a
consequence of a potential European dismembering process. Exactly as the creation of the single market has
generated positive and spatially heterogeneous effects, its dismembering is expected to slow down regional growth;
moreover, these losses are expected to be spatially heterogeneous.
Various effects of the dismembering process are logically to be foreseen. Losses may be stronger in:
• advanced regions, where advanced manufacturing and services activities are concentrated;
• regions closer to the institutional borders, that would be particularly hit by augmenting legal and administrative
barriers that would drastically reduce the size of border regions’ local markets; and
• less advanced regions, that would suffer from the loss of a pull effect generated by growing national economies.
The existing literature on Brexit, and more in general on the potential consequences of EU dismembering
(Dhingra, Ottaviano, Sampson, & Van Reenen, 2016a; Dhingra, Ottaviano, Sampson, & Van Reenen, 2016b; Jensen
& Snaith, 2016; van Reenen, 2016) does not explicitly take the regional dimension into account. Neither is this dimen-
sion accounted for in the literature on the costs of non‐Europe (Ilzkovitz et al., 2007; Boltho & Eichengreen, 2008;
Campos et al., 2014). This literature agrees on the fact that many international barriers still exist among European
countries; that these barriers cut across different fields; that they hamper the full achievement of integration advan-
tages. However, none of the aforementioned works is interested in the regional dimension of these effects.2
One of the major limits generated by the presence of barriers, in particular by legal and administrative ones, that
are more directly linked to trade, is the limitation of market size. In its turn, this causes a decrease in scale economies
for firms, a loss of competition, and, because local markets become sheltered, a decrease in average productivity. In
what follows, the main emphasis of our approach is on a specific effect that EU dismembering would cause, namely,
the loss of a large and integrated market for intermediate and final goods. This would come with the reintroduction of
duties and tariffs, while also increasing differences in legal and administrative procedures.
We focus on this issue because this is arguably most directly affected by EU dismembering. In fact, effects may be
felt even in the very short run, through the rational expectations channel. In order to make the case for the relevance
of this channel, in the next section we model in a Keynesian framework the loss of market size due to higher legal and
administrative barriers and the ensuing GDP growth slowdown. The model is meant to formalize the cause‐effect
mechanism that paves the way for the empirical application in Section 5.3 | MODELLING THE IMPACT OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS ON
REGIONAL GROWTH
In order to assess the regional impact of EU dismembering within a demand‐side framework, we can think of the impact
of an increase of new barriers to trade between regions on regional growth. Let us start by thinking of exports of region





Mji: (1)2A recent study has been run at regional level on the ‘quantification of the costs of legal and administrative barriers for land border
regions’. See Camagni et al. (2017).
CAPELLO ET AL. 5Imports of the various trading partner regions j depend on their income levels and on their propensity to import
goods and services from other regions. Moreover, total imports are the sum of the imports from all trading part-
ners, each of them having a different share of these imports. Let us define mj as the propensity to import of region
j, and mjk as the propensity of region j to import from a generic region k. Thus, total imports of region j (Mj) are
defined as:
Mj ¼ mjYj ¼ ∑kMjk ¼ ∑kmjkYj: (2)
Let us now assume, consistently with the gravity literature, that any region j tends to import more from regions
that are larger (because they have a larger variety of goods and services to buy); from regions that are closer (because
there are lower transport costs in buying their goods), and from regions specialized in exporting sectors (because they
account for a larger share of trade). This can be analytically represented as follows:
mjk ¼ ϑkYkdjk; (3)
where djk is distance between regions k and j, Yk is the economic size of the trade partner region k; and ϑk measures
the specialization of region k in exporting sectors or, in other words, the exposure of the local economy to interna-
tional trade.
Imports of the generic trading partner region j from region i are therefore equal to:
Mji ¼ mjiYj ¼ ϑiYidijYj: (4)







Let us now assume, consistently with an extended version of a Keynesian macroeconomic model, that region i's
income depends on several endogenous factors as well as on its ability to export, which is reflected in its degree of
openness. In particular, let us assume that exports impact income through the μi multiplier; then we can restate
regional income as a function of endogenous factors (at regional and national level) (Gi) and regional exports as defined
in Equation 5:
Yi ¼ Zi þ μiXi ¼ Zi þ μi∑ jϑi
Yi
dij




where Zi represents the endogenous component of a region's income. If a barrier arises between region i and any of its
trading partners j, this hampers trade between the two regions by a factor bij. This barrier can be assumed to be spe-
cific to the couples of regions; in other words, this allows to model barriers arising specifically only between specific
region couples and not others. In the case of this paper, we assume that as a consequence of the EU dismembering,
higher barriers will arise between regions belonging to EU countries.
When a new barrier arises, at time t + 1, Equation 5 modifies and the new amount of exports from region i
towards its trading partner regions decreases to:






The impact of the increased trade barrier on regional growth between times t and t + 1 is simply proportional to
the ratio of the difference between the two trade‐induced parts of income and the initial income level. Regional
6 CAPELLO ET AL.income growth (yi) still depends on the growth of all other, especially endogenous, aspects (zi), but faces a decrease
















Equation 8 can be econometrically estimated to detect the impact of the b barrier.
In order to better visualize the implications of this model, we can graphically show the impact of exports towards
other regions j on region i's income. This is basically a demand spillover, which from Equation 6 is equal to:




In order to simplify this graphical representation, we assume that all trading partners j have the same size (Yj ¼ Y).
In this case, the impact of demand spillovers on region i's income decreases with distance. This demand spillover can
be represented with an asymptotically decreasing line, as in Figure 1.
Figure 2 represents demand spillovers when we assume that an obstacle arises between region i and all trading
partner regions j. Once again for the sake of clarity this obstacle is assumed to be the same for all regions bij ¼ b
 
;
as a consequence, demand spillovers decrease by the same amount for all trading partners. In Figure 2, this in repre-
sented by a decrease in the spillover from the dotted line (representing demand spillovers without the obstacle) to the
dashed line (representing demand spillovers in the presence of the obstacle), where all values of the lower line are a
fixed proportion (1 − b) of the values of the upper line.
The case in which the obstacle arises only for the trading partners which are above a given threshold distance d
from region i is more interesting. This is the case in which, for instance, the obstacle only arises in regions belonging to
different countries, and d is the distance between region i and the border. In this case, the demand spillovers line





Trading partner regions ordered by distance from region i
FIGURE 1 Demand spillovers from other regions in the absence of obstacles
0
0
Trading partner regions ordered by distance from region i
FIGURE 2 Loss of GDP growth due to a decrease in demand spillovers as a result of a barrier's increase
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integral of the difference between the two spillovers curves, with and without the obstacle, beyond distance d. Thus,
Figure 2 illustrates why regions closer to the border are expected to suffer more from the augmented barrier.
There are parameters in the model which influence the way in which arising barriers can hamper regional growth
through demand spillover's decrease between regions. Each parameter can be linked to an effect. In particular, the
effects of arising barriers are expected to be higher when:
1. the distance of the region from the border is lower (parameter d in the model). In fact, regions closer to the border
are also closer to regions in other countries, thereby suffering more from the new barrier. This effect can be
defined a border effect;
2. the openness of a regional economy is higher, depending on their specialization in open exporting sectors (param-
eter ϑi in the model). The income of regions open to trade, in fact, depends more heavily on trade itself; therefore,
they will suffer more from the increase in the barrier between them and their trading partners. This can be called
an exposure effect;
3. accessibility of the local area from other potentially trading partners is higher. Regions closer to the geographical
centre of Europe (i.e. having on average a smaller parameter dij) will suffer more from the presence of new
barriers, as they gained more in the periods of increased integration. This effect can be termed centrality
effect; and
4. the distance of a regional economy to significant trading partners (that are comparatively large in economic terms) is
lower (parameter Yj in the model). Larger trading partners are in fact expected to import, ceteris paribus, more
goods and services with respect to smaller ones. This can be defined a demand concentration effect.
In the European case, the two last situations are normally present for the same regions, as the European economic
core, that is, the area with maximum agglomeration of economic activities, overlaps with the geographical core,
namely, the area with higher centrality and accessibility. As a consequence, regions closer to the centre of Europe will
simultaneously be more accessible and closer to large trading partners.
Two effects, acting in opposite directions, cannot be considered in this framework. The first effect is a possible
export diversion of a regional economy which, facing increased barriers in exporting to the traditional destination
8 CAPELLO ET AL.market, will search for other (possibly further) export markets. Significant trade diversion effects would imply an over-
estimation of the impacts discussed in this paper.
The second effect is the indirect effect going from a region to another through third‐party regions. It is in fact
possible that, facing increased barriers between the target region and its trading partner, also other regions, trading
partners of the latter, would decrease their demand from the first region due to reduced income and to decreased
intra‐industry trade. The presence of this second effect may potentially cause a downward bias of the results (under-
estimation). Since we cannot measure these two effects, that act in opposite directions, we have no clue about the
real extent of the bias in the empirical results, if any.4 | MARKET SIZE, GDP GROWTH AND LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
BARRIERS: AN EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION
4.1 | Empirical methodology
This section provides and empirical validation of the model discussed in Section 3. Equation 8 can be rewritten in a
reduced form as:
yT−t ¼ αþ βZ þ γSþ ε; (10)
where yT‐t measures gross value added growth between t and T (in this case, respectively equal to 2008 and 2013
3).
This is regressed against a matrix Z of regional growth factors, including a NUTS 3 region's settlement structure,
its urbanization economies, accessibility, saving propensity, level of trust, human capital, intensity of knowledge and
product innovation activities, and spare productive capacity, as suggested by the main theoretical paradigms behind
regional growth theory, namely the theory of bounded rationality and decision‐making under conditions of uncer-
tainty (Malmgren, 1961; Simon, 1972) and their application to industrial innovation (Dosi, 1982; Nelson & Winter,
1982) and the cognitive approach to district economies and synergies, which comprises the Italian school (Becattini,
1990), the French “proximity” approach (Gilly & Torre, 2000), the GREMI approach to local innovative environments
(Camagni, 1991; Camagni & Maillat, 2006), and Michael Storper's concept of “untraded interdependencies” (Storper,
1995), highlighting agglomeration economies, innovation, knowledge and cultural aspects, in the form of territorial
identity (Capello, 2017) as sources of competitiveness.
Matrix S measures the demand spillovers’ effects due to the presence of a barrier B, estimating the difference
between demand spillover effects (WY * Openness) and the same effects when a barrier is present (WY * Openness * B):
S ¼ ф WY *Opennessð Þ−Ψ WY *Openness*Bð Þ; (11)
where Equation 11, translating Equation 7 in empirical terms, assumes, as in the theoretical model, that demand spill-
overs are mediated by a region's degree of openness (ϑi in the theoretical model), by distance (W) and by the economic





where wij is an entry in the geographical distance matrixW, while i and j indicate two generic regions. In this paper, the
W matrix is based on a standard great circle distance between the regions’ centroids.3Regressions have been run on the 2006–2013 period as a robustness check, without significantly affecting our findings. The choice
of the 2008–2013 period for measuring the dependent variable is motivated by the aim not to include the last pre‐crisis years, which
would significantly bias the picture of regional growth in Europe.
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region is potentially exposed to the positive effect of the existence of a wider external market. In this paper, in the
absence of accurate interregional trade at this very detailed spatial level, we proxy openness with the specialization
in manufacturing activities;4 given the limited size of the spatial units (European NUTS 3 regions) here analysed, it
is reasonable to assume that most manufactured goods will not be consumed locally and will therefore be shipped
at least beyond regional borders. While this choice clearly presents the potential limitation of underestimating trade
in services5 and especially openness for regions specialized in advanced services, which tend to be the most important
global players (Capello & Fratesi, 2013), it must be recognized that a large share of high value added services still tend
to be consumed locally despite the undeniable trend of internationalization in their consumption (Roberts, 1989;
WTO, 2016).6
Notice that estimating γ is the direct consequence of the existence of the parameter μi in Equation 8. This param-
eter, estimated as such, incorporates all four effects which are presented at the end of the previous section and gives a
quantification of the magnitude of the aggregate effect assuming the presence of the four impedances of accessibility,
distance from large regions, openness to trade and presence of barriers through the borders.
Lastly, a word must be spent on the B matrix in Equation 11. Within all possible (cultural, linguistic, social) inter-
national barriers we could discuss, our choice was to focus on legal and administrative barriers, which are expected to
influence trade flows more directly. Were these barriers to increase as a consequence of EU dismembering, they
would cause a reduction in the free circulation of freight, through higher tariffs on international goods shipments
and through price differences, menu costs, and reinstated currency risk (Obstfeld & Rogoff, 2000).
For this reason, B is a bilateral matrix measuring the intensity of legal and administrative barriers between regions’
couples, measured through the perception that people have of such barriers.7 This is a very broad indicator, that does
not delve into a detailed definition of such barriers. While this may provide an imperfect picture of the intensity of
these barriers, it certainly offers a broad assessment that would be impossible were more detailed indicators chosen.
Moreover, in a simulation exercises, having the perception that people have of such barriers as a variable can be useful
to interpret expectations about the problems caused by augmented legal and administrative barriers; without waiting
for barriers to actually increase, effects will be felt simply because of the expectations that people form about the
future increase in these barriers.4.2 | Measuring the intensity of legal barriers in European regions
The data base assembled for the empirical verification of the framework discussed above includes the regional growth
factors listed in subsection 4.1. Table 1 provides a detailed account of the main indicators, data and sources for each
control variable of the Z endogenous factors.
A more detailed account of the way legal barriers have been measured is instead needed. Among the many pos-
sible ways to capture the intensity of interregional legal barrier, we resorted to the use of survey data. In particular,
the intensity of legal and administrative barriers is captured by the average regional score in the question “Thinking
about the cooperation between your Country and [COUNTRY FROM PROGRAMME XX], to what extent are legal
or administrative differences a problem?” asked within the Eurobarometer 422 flash survey on interregional4The issue of trade data availability at the regional level is discussed in Brakman and Van Marrewijk (2017).
5Services have been increasing their share of world trade since at least 1985 (Capello, Fratesi, & Resmini, 2011).
6Empirically, manufacturing still appears a much better proxy for trade openness, as also evidenced by the much higher relevance of
manufactured goods trade over trade in commercial services (WTO, 2016). In 2015, the last year with full WTO data available, mer-
chandise trade outweighed trade in commercial services by a factor of 4.57. Technically, this potential bias should translate into a low
impact of raising legal barriers as a consequence of the EU dismembering in areas specialized in internationally open advanced ser-
vices, such as South‐Eastern England. Fortunately, results demonstrate this is not the case.
7See subsection 4.2 for a detailed description of the way in which matrix B is built.
TABLE 1 Indicators, data and sources
Category Indicator Data Source Year
Dependent variable Regional
growth
Growth of gross value added EUROSTAT 2008–2013
Knowledge and
innovation
Knowledge Number of patent applications to the European patent










Accessibility Location quotient of multimodal accessibility




Population density EUROSTAT 2006
Human
capital







Share of GVA in manufacturing over total GVA EUROSTAT 2006
Productive
capacity








Share of persons that in the European value study
consider it important or very important to teach





















Source: Capello et al. (2016), own elaboration.
Notes: aShare of respondents “Important” or “Very Important” to the EVS question “Here is a list of qualities which children
can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five": the
importance of thrift”
bagglomerated regions are defined as those regions hosting a city of more than 300,000 inhabitants and a population density
higher than 300 inhabitants/km sq. or with a a population density between 150− and 300 inhabitants/km sq. Urban regions
are defined as hosting a city between 150,000 and 300,000 inhabitants and a population density between 150 and 300
inhabitants/km sq. (or a smaller population density – between 100 and 150 inh./km but with a bigger centre, with more than
300,000 inh.) or a population density between 100 and 150 inh./kms sq. Finally, rural regions are those areas with a popula-
tion density lower than 100 inh./ sq. km. and a centre with more than 125,000 inh., or a population density lower than 100
inh./sq. kms. with a centre smaller than 125,000 inhabitants. See also Capello and Chizzolini (2008).
cShare of respondents to the following questions have been applied: “Most people can be trusted” to the EVS question
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?”
10 CAPELLO ET AL.cooperation. Possible answers to this question range from “A major problem” (encoded as 1) through “A minor
problem (2)” to “Not a problem at all (encoded as 3).” Questionnaires have been administered in September 2015
and include a grand total of 40,619 individual observations distributed across the EU28 countries plus Norway and
Switzerland. In fact, this is the geographical sample of countries participating in EU cross‐border cooperation (hence-
forth, CBC) programmes (European Commission, 2016).
While absolute numbers of interviewees are relatively limited, ranging from 300 in Portugal to 4,410 in
Germany, it is worth stressing that the interviewed sample has been selected only among citizens of border areas
directly involved in CBC activities, and therefore knowledgeable about the possible limitations and obstacles associ-
ated to this type of actions. As mentioned above, the main advantage of the use of a broad measure is to allow our
analyses to account for all possible legal and administrative barriers hampering regional growth, without entering
into a detailed definition of such barriers. On the other hand, limitations are those typical of survey data, with a
particular word of caution related to the difficulty in quantifying the strength of such barriers for the average
interviewee.
CAPELLO ET AL. 11Since data are classified per country couple, we obtain a matrix of legal barrier where an average score ranging
from 1 to 3 represents the average perceived legal and administrative barrier for a country couple. This prompts
the generation of a pairwise asymmetric country blocks‐matrix where each country couple (for instance, AT‐DE)
has constant values that can (and typically do) differ from the symmetric country couple (say, DE‐AT).4.3 | Estimation results
Table 2 shows the results of empirically estimating Equation 10. Results are organized along six columns, each based
on heteroskedastic‐robust OLS estimates of a specification including country fixed effects (columns (1)–(3)) or
SARAR estimates (columns (4)–(6), also including country fixed effects). 2008–2013 value added growth is regressed
against initial value added, the region's settlement structure, and the regional growth factors described in Section 4.2,
and used also in Capello, Caragliu, and Fratesi (2017). Columns differ in that while the first and the fourth presents
the estimation of Equation 10 with geographical spillovers alone, the second, third, fifth, and sixth columns also
include the interactions of the latter with the degree of openness, and the degree of openness and legal barriers,
respectively.
Across all models, some control variables are found to be always positively and significantly associated to
regional growth, such as human capital and product innovation, while others negatively affect regional economic
performance (such as a more urbanized settlement structure – not surprisingly, since cities have been most directly
affected by the economic contraction taking place over the observed time frame; see e.g. Capello, Caragliu, & Fratesi,
2015).
As for demand spillovers, they are always correlated with regional growth, although in the first specification
statistical significance is only marginally below the usual 10% threshold.
The main result of these estimates is shown in columns (2) and (3). While in column (2) demand spillovers
interacted with the openness indicator are found to be positively and significantly associated to regional economic
growth, their interaction with the legal barrier is negatively and significantly correlated with regional performance.
All in all, results hint at a hampering role played by institutional barriers in European regional growth.8
A number of consistency checks have also been performed to verify the robustness of our findings. VIF across the
different regressors averages 3; multicollinearity seems in general not to be a major problem. However, as often the
case in the empirical literature involving multiple interactions, the last and most important parameter of interest (the
interaction between demand spillovers, degree of openness, and legal barriers) does reach a VIF of 11. In this case, we
looked for the factor driving this result; in the end, the estimate coefficient is still significant, which testifies for the
strength of the identified result (in fact, multicollinearity causes an increase in the standard error of the estimated
parameter, which can be obnoxious only if the estimated parameter itself is not large enough). Given that the legal
and administrative barriers are here estimated on the basis of country couples data, the clear suspect is the set of
dummy variables. Once these are dropped from the estimates, VIF of the interaction terms drops to 1.52. Since esti-
mated dummies are of minor interest in this paper, we believe this to be safe evidence that multicollinearity is not an
issue in these estimates.
We also tested for spatial autocorrelation in the residuals and find that, as testified by Moran's I tests, there is
some minor (in absolute terms), although significant spatial autocorrelation left in our estimates. Conservatively, we8As a further robustness check we also replaced the great circle distance used to calculate demand spillovers with binary and eco-
nomic distance, the former calculated with a 5 arcminutes distance band, the latter on the basis of the initial value added. Our main
findings are all in all robust to these consistency checks. In the first case (binary weight matrix), the demand spillovers * degree of
openness estimated parameter is equal to 0.04 (not significant at the standard significance levels), but the demand spillovers * degree
of openness * legal barrier is again negative, equal to −0.07, and significant at the 95 per cent confidence level. In the case of the eco-
nomic weight matrix, the demand spillovers * degree of openness estimated parameter is equal to 0.11, the demand spillovers * degree
of openness * legal barrier is again negative, equal to –0.11, and both are only marginally insignificant (p‐value equal to 0.12 and 0.108,
respectively).
TABLE 2 Empirical estimates of Equation 10
Dependent variable: 2008–2013 growth of GVA















































































































































Demand spillovers 0.08 – – 0.01** – –
(0.00) (0.00)
















Heteroskedasticity–robust standard errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs. 1,069 1,068 1,068 1,068 1,068 1,068
R2 0.57 0.58 0.58 – – –
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS SARAR SARAR SARAR
Average VIF 3.02 2.33 3.00 – – –
Hausman test (OLS vs. IV§) – – 0.68
(0.41)
– – –
Moran's I 0.0087 0.0083 0.0079*** – – –
Pseudo p–value 0.00 0.00 0.00 – – –












Joint F–test of significance 33.76*** 26.83*** 24.71*** – – –
Notes: Heteroscedasticity–robust standard errors in brackets. OLS parameters are standardised. *, **, and *** imply signifi-
cance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence level, respectively.
§The endogeneity Hausman test has been performed on the triple interaction term Demand spillovers * Degree of openness *
Legal barrier term.
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CAPELLO ET AL. 13re‐estimated the three models with a SARAR specification.9 Results of this battery of estimates are reported in
Table 2, columns (4)–(6). Our main findings hold exactly as with OLS estimates, with the same sign and significance
(although parameters estimated with the SARAR specification are not standardized and hence cannot be compared
to the previous results, columns (1)–(3) in the same table).
Lastly, while these empirical tests are not meant to address causality, we did perform the classical Durbin‐Wu‐
Hausman test for the endogeneity of the demand spillovers – degree of openness – legal barrier term. The
Durbin‐Wu‐Hausman test starts from the null hypothesis that OLS and IV estimates are equivalent (Baum, Schaffer,
& Stillman, 2003). If this H0 cannot be rejected (which is the case as shown in Table 2), then there is no need for
instrumenting the variable of interest. While this first test is clearly not fully solving the issue of endogeneity, we
believe that, in addition to the use of time‐lagged explanatory variables, endogeneity should be a minor problem –
if any – in these results.5 | SPATIAL EFFECTS OF INCREASED LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
BARRIERS
The previous section empirically verified the model set out in Section 3, and provided an assessment of the intensity
of the impact of legal and administrative barriers on regional growth through a demand effect linked the reduction of
export spillovers. On the basis of these findings, this Section presents an analysis of the impact of new barriers arising
between European Countries. In particular, we focus on the possible increase in legal and administrative barriers, as
measured in Section 4.
The aim of this section is to present a simulation of what the regional demand‐side costs of dismembering the EU
due to new legal and administrative barriers between countries could be. This simulation requires some assumptions
on what could happen once these barriers increase to the maximum level between each country couple. This implies
testing what happens in case European regions, rather than having the current intensity of legal and administrative
barriers, face an increase to the maximum possible level.10
The impact of the newly increase barriers on each European region i is calculated, consistently with Equation 8, as
in the following Equation 13. Equation 13 shows that the impact is a positive function of parameter μ (whose estimate
has been presented in Section 4), of the regional degree of openness ϑi (proxied by regional manufacturing specializa-




, discounted by the arising of a new bilateral barrier (Δbij):




The new legal and administrative barrier, in this simulation, will be the difference between the maximum pos-
sible level on the variable scale and the actual level of the barrier. With this approach, all EU regions will experience
an increase of legal and administrative barriers with respect to other countries; however, this increase will be larger
in absolute terms for those regions currently benefiting from relatively low barriers. By increasing barriers in all
countries, we actually simulate the effects of EU dismembering, in the case that Brexit is followed up by other
countries.9More specifically, spatial autocorrelation is addressed on the basis of a SARAR model in the specification of Arraiz, Drukker, Kelejian,
and Prucha (2010) and Drukker, Egger, and Prucha (2013). The model reported in columns (4)–(6) therefore includes a weighted
average of regional value added growth (the spatial lag component), as a right‐hand‐side variable; thus, it allows us to verify whether
disturbances depend on a weighted average of other units’ disturbances.
10Clearly, some region couple already reached the maximum level; as a consequence, while representing the (negative) benchmark, in
this simulation the values in these region couples do not change.
14 CAPELLO ET AL.Results of this simulation are presented in two maps which show the impact in terms of losses of GDP growth due
demand spillovers’ limitations which forcedly follow an increase of legal and administrative barriers (Figure 3). In
particular, Figure 3a presents the GDP growth losses in absolute terms, while Figure 3b displays the same result in
relative terms, namely, with the colour of each region representing the impact with respect to the Country average
(set to 100). Using both maps, it is easier to detect which EU NUTS3 regions would be more affected in the case
of the EU dismembering, and separatist policies would be implemented in each country.
Figure 3a shows that impacts would not be homogeneous among countries and regions, and that four spatial
effects, all linked to the parameters of the theoretical model, emerge with evidence.
In particular, it clearly emerges that countries more affected would be those in central Europe, especially those
among the original six EU members which also had more time to strengthen their relationships (notably, France,
Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands). However, results also show that the UK would also be negatively affected by
this scenario, because of its proximity to, and its close relations with, the European core. More geographically periph-
eral countries, in particular Scandinavian and Iberian ones, and the Balkans, are in absolute terms less directly affected
by GDP losses due to a reduction of demand spillovers.
At the regional scale, some features of the processes are clearly identifiable, especially with the joint use of the two
maps showing the absolute and the relative effects, respectively, at the left and right‐hand side of Figure 3). As
expected, regions closer to the border are ceteris paribus more affected. This is evident in most countries, for instance
France and Italy, but is not a deterministic feature as in other countries, such as Germany and the UK, this effect is in
fact overcome by other effects, so that border regions are not always necessarily the most affected ones in absolute
terms. On the contrary, the border effect is especially strong in Central and Eastern European countries, such as Poland,
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. In these countries, increased barriers will be detrimental especially for regions
which benefited more in the past from their EU accession because of their proximity to the EU borders.(a) Absolute values (b) Relative values (each region with respect to its nation) 




















FIGURE 3 Loss of GDP due to the increase in legal and administrative barriers between European countries
CAPELLO ET AL. 15The effects of new legal and administrative barriers also show an agglomeration pattern. Ceteris paribus, more
peripheral regions and less dense areas are less affected than central and dense ones. This suggests the presence
of a centrality effect and a demand concentration effect, because regions which are more central and/or closer to
other significant economies are more affected, as it was expected from the model. This is evident in Figure 3 for most
countries, for example in France around Paris; in Germany, along the Rhine Valley; in the UK around the axis going
from London to Liverpool through Birmingham and Manchester; but also in Greece, around Athens or Bulgaria and
Romania around Sofia and Bucharest, respectively.
Finally, the degree of openness also matters, as evidenced by the higher values estimated for regions belonging to
traditionally export‐oriented manufacturing areas, such as theThird Italy or the Ruhr valley in Germany. This suggests
that the increase of administrative barriers is subject to an exposure effect.
All in all, it looks like the newly augmented legal and administrative barriers will be damaging mostly regions in
Western Germany, an area where all effects suggested by the model (and here empirically estimated) are simulta-
neously at play. In fact, these areas are highly accessible due to their centrality; are highly agglomerated as each region
is very dense and close to other dense areas; are highly specialized in export manufacturing; and, finally, are very close
to the border with France, Belgium and the Netherlands. The demand impact of dismembering the EU will on the con-
trary be lower for Bulgaria and Greece, two countries that are geographically peripheral and whose economies depend
less on exports with respect to other EU countries.6 | CONCLUSIONS
This paper highlighted the spatial effects that could occur in case other EU countries would follow the UK example,
and decide to leave the EU, leading to its dismembering. Within all possible effects that may take place, the paper
focused on the impacts that market size reductions would have on trade flows, in their turn due to the reinstatement
of substantial legal and administrative barriers.
We theoretically modelled within a Keynesian framework the impact of such barriers on trade. Because these bar-
riers would hamper demand spillovers that regions benefit from by being part of the SingleMarket, augmented legal and
administrative barriers would cause four spatial effects: an exposure effect, due to the different openness of regions, a
centrality effect, due to the different accessibility of regions in spatial terms, a demand concentration effect, due to the
different closeness of regions to large trade partners and a border effect, due to the different distance of regions from
the borders. Within the theoretical model set out in this paper, none of these effects is ex ante expected to prevail.
The paper then econometrically tested this theoretical model. Empirical results show that existing legal and admin-
istrative barriers between EU countries do generate demand spillover losses, which result in slower GDP growth.
Econometric estimates also allow to give a value to the parameter which are theoretically derived from the model.
However, it is important to acknowledge that endogeneity issues have not been fully tackled in this paper and results
should be therefore interpreted with care, and possibly strengthened by robust testing and credible instruments.11
Based on these parameters, a simulation exercisewas carried out, where barriers are strongly augmented among all
EU countries. Results of this simulation show that demand spillovers decrease with different intensity in different
regions. The centrality effect tends to prevail, because in Europe the geographic core and the most agglomerated areas
tend to coincide; however, once this point is taken into account by measuring losses with respect to the country mean
(thereby making the distance of each region with respect to the EU economic core more homogeneous), the other
effects emerge more clearly.
Simulations suggest that the spatial impacts would be strongly heterogeneous among EU regions. Some rich areas
in West Germany would in particular face the highest losses, because of the cumulative negative impacts due to the11While the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test discussed in Section 4 suggests no need to resort on IV estimation, it must be acknowledged
that the test does not ensure that endogeneity is fully solved. We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing at this issue.
16 CAPELLO ET AL.four different spatial effects. Europe's engine would therefore face stronger negative consequences, which would
probably cause in the medium and long run an additional growth slowdown in the rest of Europe.
Our findings hint at a very relevant role played by inherently space‐specific effects in shaping the impact of a EU
dismembering, well beyond macroeconomic factors that are at a first sight first expected to channel such impacts. The
creation of the Common Market and the EU has in fact enacted a number of changes in the way EU national econo-
mies interact with one another. National economies are now strongly interconnected, and our findings suggest that
any attempt to break these linkages could not come without a cost, part of which is spatially very heterogeneous.
In fact, these impacts occur well beyond areas where legal and administrative barriers are already relatively high, to
impact also regions that so far gained the most from the creation of the EU.
Moreover, although presently at a merely speculative level, it can be argued that these effects could be at play
even in the very short run, right after possible decisions to exit the EU would be made by countries other than the
UK. The rational expectation channel (captured by a subjective nature of our variable “barrier”) could in fact rapidly
transfer such negative beliefs to firms and consumers, instantaneously decreasing trade flows, thus ultimately slowing
down GDP growth.
Our research presents potential promising extensions along many directions. One line of research could be to
address the impact of augmenting barriers within a macro‐econometric regional growth model, which allows us to for-
mally take account of the likely interactions between these newly augmented barriers and other regional growth fac-
tors, and to estimate the feed‐back effects that the decrease in demand spillovers would generate on supply side
elements fostering GDP growth. Another line of research relates the analysis of the spatially heterogeneous macro-
economic effects caused by the dismembering process, in general treated and analysed as space invariant.
This rich agenda needs to be quickly undertaken so that sound and evidence‐based policy suggestions can follow
suit, and political decisions can be fed with a clearer picture of what the likely consequences in the various scenarios
could be.
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